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Typically, scientists call subjects they investigate scientific phenomena. While the notion of a scientific phenomenon seems to be common in science, it has, apart from a few exceptions in the 1980s [1] [2], not been systematically discussed in philosophy of science. This is surprising and stands in sharp contrast to the extensive discussion that the notions of data and of theory have provoked. It is only now that especially young philosophers are trying to bring the notion of a scientific phenomenon back onto the agenda [3] [4] [5].

The aim of the conference is to critically evaluate the prospects of this emerging interest. In particular, we are interested in the following two questions:  What does the notion of a scientific phenomenon mean? Why has the notion not been discussed in philosophy of science for several years?

In regard to the first question we invite both scientists and philosophers to explicate their understanding of the notion of a scientific phenomenon. We suspect that these approaches can be broadly aligned to one of two groups: One way of understanding the notion traces back to the ancient astronomical program called “Saving the phenomena” which claims that astronomical theories should account for the observed orbits of celestial bodies without violating the principles of Greek natural philosophy. In this sense, scientific phenomena are observed facts that should be explained [2]. A second way of understanding the notion starts out with the diagnosis that scientific explanations often do not concern observed facts, but rather some general patterns that can be inferred from the data. One therefore might suggest to broaden the notion of a scientific phenomenon in order to include these unobservable patterns and to take scientific phenomena generally as the explananda of scientific theories [1]. If knowledge about phenomena, however, is indeed typically gained via inferences, a second problem arises: in what sense are phenomena theory-laden [6] [7]? Are scientific phenomena on a par with theoretical entities?

It is exactly these last questions that have led us to ask our second, rather metatheoretical question concerning the reasons for not discussing the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Instead of assuming that the notion has simply been overlooked, one might well be sceptical as to whether the analysis yields any new philosophical insights at all. Depending on the way one uses the notion, one might end up in well known discussions either about observations and its putative theory-ladenness or about theories and explanations.

To summarize, the conference aims at better understanding the notion of a scientific phenomenon. How should the notion be used? Does it, in one sense or the other, do any philosophical work at all?

Kontakt:
Prof. Dr. Andreas Kemmerling
Universität Heidelberg, Philosophisches Seminar
Schulgasse 6, 69117 Heidelberg
Telefon: +49 6221 / 54 24 86
Fax: +49 6221 / 54 2281
sak(at)uni-hd.de